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INTRODUCTION 
Noncompete agreements, once used infrequently and limited to highly 
specialized industries, are becoming ubiquitous in employment contracts.1 
These agreements are frequently overly broad and often restrict employees 
who have no specialized knowledge or training and who pose no threat to 
an employer’s competitive advantage. One such case is that of Catherine 
Kimball. HEALTHCAREfirst (“HCF”) offered Catherine Kimball 
employment as a consultant and salesperson in charge of providing 
technology services to healthcare agencies.2 Before Kimball accepted the 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by KRISTEN AMOND. 
 1. See Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the 
Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2291, 2297 (2002) (“Given the degree of protection that restrictive 
covenants can offer, some commentators have suggested that employers should 
routinely include them in their employees’ contracts, even if they may not be 
necessary.”). 
 2. HEALTHCAREfirst is a national company that provides web-based home 
health and hospice services to caregivers. About Us, HEALTHCAREFIRST, 
http://w2.healthcarefirst.com/who-we-are/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). The company 
is based in Missouri, but has an office in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Contact 
HEALTHCAREfirst, HEALTHCAREFIRST, http://w2.healthcarefirst.com/contact-
us/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). Catherine Kimball’s attorney, Amy Newsom, 
provided all of the information on Kimball’s journey through litigation. Interview 
with Amy Newsom, Newsom Law Firm, in Baton Rouge, La. (Sept. 18, 2014). 
Litigation arose in the Middle District of Louisiana. Kimball v. 
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position, but after she had resigned from her previous employment, HCF 
informed her that she would be required to sign a noncompete agreement.3 
Because Kimball had already resigned from her previous employment, she 
felt that she had no option but to sign the noncompete agreement.  
HCF, a national company that used both telephone and web-based 
technology, allowed Kimball to work from her home in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. Kimball’s service territory changed 13 times during her three 
years of employment, allowing Kimball to service agencies in all 50 states 
during her employment with HCF.4 Despite working for HCF for years, 
the company laid off Kimball, forcing her to seek new employment.5  
Kimball applied to work at a California company that did nearly 
identical work to HCF and would allow her to work from her home in 
Louisiana. The California employer was ready to offer Kimball a job when 
she told the company that she had signed a noncompete agreement with 
HCF. The company refused to hire Kimball unless HCF released her from 
the noncompete agreement or a court invalidated the agreement. HCF 
refused to release Kimball from the agreement, and as a result, the 
California employer declined to offer Kimball employment.  
Because of the restrictive noncompete agreement, Kimball was left 
unemployed, and she had few options for future employment. The 
noncompete agreement restricted employees from working in every state 
in the United States, Guam, and Puerto Rico6 and thus was geographically 
overbroad under Louisiana law.7 Only after Kimball filed suit, did HCF 
concede that the noncompete agreement was overly broad and seek 
reformation of the agreement to make it enforceable.8  
HCF’s concession, however, arrived too late. By the time the court 
declared Kimball’s noncompete agreement invalid, the California 
company had rescinded the job offer.9 Throughout the litigation 
                                                                                                             
HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., No. 12–395, 2013 WL 4782139 (M.D. La. Sept. 5, 
2013). 
 3. Interview with Amy Newsom, supra note 2. 
 4. Because Kimball worked in each state, HCF’s noncompete agreement, 
which forbade ex-employees from working in any place where they did work for 
HCF, effectively prohibited her from competing in any state in the nation. 
 5. Interview with Amy Newsom, supra note 2. 
 6. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Kimball v. 
HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., No. 12–395 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2012), 2012 WL 6197360.  
 7. The agreement violated Louisiana law because it did not restrict 
competition to the parishes or municipalities in which the employer did business. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015).  
 8. Kimball v. HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., No. 12–395, 2013 WL 4782139, at 
*2 (M.D. La. Sept. 5, 2013). 
 9. Interview with Amy Newsom, supra note 2. 
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concerning the validity of the noncompete agreement, Kimball hoped that 
the California company would hold her job offer, so she did not seek other 
employment. Even if she had, the noncompete agreement would have 
likely prevented her from being hired because there had been no judicial 
declaration that the agreement was overly broad. Because Kimball could 
not work, she was unable to pay her bills and almost lost her home due to 
foreclosure.  
Although Kimball’s situation is an extreme example of the damage 
caused by an overly broad noncompete agreement, other problems arise 
from Louisiana’s current noncompete law. This law causes problems for 
two reasons: noncompete agreements are often overly broad and are 
overused. Kimball’s situation demonstrates the negative consequences of 
overly broad noncompete agreements. 
Overly broad noncompete agreements are contrary to Louisiana’s 
public policy in favor of competition, and therefore are absolutely null.10 
Aggrieved employees, however, find no recompense in the three remedies 
provided by Louisiana’s nullity doctrine—dissolution, reformation, and 
damages.11 As such, Louisiana’s noncompete landscape should provide 
employees with avenues for recovery if they suffer economic harm due an 
illegally restrictive agreement. 
Current Louisiana law incentivizes employers to draft overly broad 
noncompete agreements because Louisiana courts are willing to sever 
overly broad provisions if the agreement contains a severability clause,12 
which renders the remainder of the agreement enforceable.13 Between the 
termination of employment and the initiation of litigation to reform a 
noncompete agreement, the overly broad agreement remains in place. 
During this time, the employer benefits from the employee’s uncertainty 
as to the enforceability of the noncompete agreement, and the employee is 
unlawfully restricted from competing.14 The court’s discretion to 
determine what portions, if any, of a noncompete agreement can be 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 670 So. 2d 1223, 1223 (La. 1996) 
(mem.); Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247, 257 (La. Ct. App. 2006) 
(using a severability clause to “excise the offending language from the non-
compete clause without doing undue damage to the remainder of the provision”). 
 13. See, e.g., SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 309 
(La. 2001) (allowing for the use of a severability clause to strike an unenforceable 
provision, while leaving the remainder of the contract intact). 
 14. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument 
for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 690 (2008). 
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severed or reformed makes it impossible for an employee to determine 
whether the agreement is valid and enforceable on its face.15 
The Louisiana Legislature or the Louisiana Supreme Court could cure 
the uncertainty of enforceability that plagues noncompete agreements and 
deter employers from drafting overly broad agreements by terminating a 
court’s ability to reform these agreements. Compared to other states’ 
noncompetition statutes, Louisiana’s statute is detailed and provides 
concrete requirements and restrictions on drafting noncompete 
agreements. Nowhere in the statute, however, did the legislature include 
the possibility for reformation or severability.16 This suggests that the 
legislature did not intend for the courts to reform these unenforceable 
agreements. Indeed, reformation of noncompete agreements is relatively 
new, as Louisiana courts of appeal did not reform overly broad 
noncompete agreements until 1996.17 
The defects in Louisiana’s noncompete law also produce the 
secondary effect of employers’ overuse of noncompete agreements. 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921 enables employers to easily 
draft noncompete agreements for any employee without justifying the 
need for restricting the employee. Employers—at little to no present or 
future cost—arm themselves with the threat of enforcing the agreements 
against employees and applicants whose only choices are to sign them or 
not accept a job.18  
                                                                                                             
 15. See id.  
 16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015). 
 17. Compare Comet Indus., Inc., v. Lawrence, 600 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 
1992) (refusing to reform a noncompete agreement), with AMCOM, 670 So. 2d 
1223 (reinstating trial court’s ruling that allowed reformation of a noncompete 
agreement). In AMCOM v. Battson, the Louisiana Supreme Court infused 
uncertainty into Louisiana’s approach to noncompete agreements by allowing for 
reformation without any statutory support or explanation. See generally id.; see 
also Carey C. Lyon, Comment, Oppress the Employee: Louisiana’s Approach to 
Noncompetition Agreements, 61 LA. L. REV. 605, 628 (2001).  
 18. For instance, low-wage employees of Jimmy John’s Gourmet 
Sandwiches who make and deliver sandwiches have recently filed lawsuits 
against their employer regarding its restrictive noncompete agreements. See Class 
and Collective Action Complaint, Kubelskas v. Jimmy John’s Enters., Inc., No. 
1:14-CV-06134 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2014); Memorandum Opinion, Brunner v. 
Jimmy John’s Enters., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-05509 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015) (declining 
to grant declaratory or injunctive relief that would prevent Jimmy John’s 
franchisees from enforcing noncompete agreements of Jimmy John’s employees 
because the plaintiffs alleged insufficient facts to confer standing). Jimmy John’s 
requires its employees, regardless of position or salary, to sign noncompete 
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To rectify the overuse of noncompete agreements in Louisiana, the 
legislature should amend section 23:921 to require businesses to identify 
a justifiable reason—a protectable interest—to restrain an employee.19 If 
the law required employers to draft noncompete agreements with purpose, 
instead of formulaic ease, many employers would draft noncompete 
agreements only when necessary—when an employee legitimately 
threatens the employer’s competitive advantage. The pervasive misuse of 
noncompete agreements needs to be curbed because these agreements 
infringe on an employee’s liberty interest in obtaining employment. 
Solving the problems that cause overly broad noncompete agreements and 
their overuse may require a joint effort from the Louisiana Legislature and 
the Louisiana Supreme Court. 
If the Louisiana Legislature is unwilling to amend the state’s 
noncompete law by eliminating the courts’ ability to reform noncompete 
agreements or by requiring employers to prove a protectable interest, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court must take action. If the legislature refuses to act, 
the Court should mimic the courts of other states and adopt the tort of 
tortious interference with contractual relations to address abuse of 
noncompete agreements.20 Tortious interference with contractual relations 
is not currently recognized in Louisiana as a cause of action for overly 
broad noncompete agreements.21 A cause of action for tortious 
interference with contractual relations empowers both employees and 
employers to enforce their rights. The tort provides an employee with a 
countervailing remedy if she suffers damage due to an overly broad 
noncompete agreement. Further, the tort aids employers by allowing them 
to sue a competitor who hires a former employee in violation of a valid 
noncompete agreement. The tort will also stifle the overuse of noncompete 
agreements because employers will face the possibility of a lawsuit and 
damages if they do not draft a noncompete agreement in compliance with 
                                                                                                             
agreements. Class and Collective Action Complaint, supra; Memorandum 
Opinion, supra. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part IV.B.  
 21. See 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1989). In 
Spurney, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly refused to adopt the common 
law doctrine of tortious interference, recognizing “only a corporate officer’s duty 
to refrain from intentional and unjustified interference with the contractual 
relation between his employer and a third person.” Id. Other courts have not 
expanded the tortious interference doctrine. See, e.g., Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
CNA Ins. Cos., 557 So. 2d 966, 969 (La. 1990); Petrohawk Props., L.P. v. 
Chesapeake La., L.P., 689 F.3d 380, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2012); Technical Control 
Sys., Inc. v. Green, 809 So. 2d 1204 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
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Louisiana’s law. The legislative and judicial solutions to the overused and 
overly broad noncompete agreements in Louisiana are not mutually 
exclusive. Ideally, all of these changes would be implemented to provide 
employers with damages when an employee breaches a valid noncompete 
agreement and to give employees a remedy for damages when an employer 
drafts an overly broad noncompete agreement.  
Part I of this Comment discusses both the use of noncompete 
agreements throughout the United States and the history and enforceability 
of noncompete agreements in Louisiana. Part II explores the doctrine of 
nullity and three remedies for null agreements under current Louisiana 
law. Specifically, this Part analyzes an action for damages under Louisiana 
Civil Code article 2033 as a remedy for absolutely null noncompete 
agreements and examines the appropriateness of reformation of overly 
broad noncompete agreements. Part III discusses how reformation leads to 
drafting overly broad agreements, which leaves both employers and 
employees uncertain about the enforceability of the agreement. This Part 
also addresses the problems of overuse of noncompete agreements in 
Louisiana caused by the lack of a requirement that employers demonstrate 
a protectable interest. Part IV offers both legislative and judicial solutions 
to address the pervasive problems in Louisiana’s noncompete statute and 
to stifle the overuse and overbreadth of noncompete agreements. 
I. NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE 
UNITED STATES AND LOUISIANA 
Almost every state in the United States limits restrictions on 
employment competition within legislatively or judicially imposed means.22 
Many states view noncompete agreements as violating public policy 
because the agreements improperly restrain employees from competition 
and hinder efficiency of the employment market.23 Certain agreements, 
however, are enforceable to protect businesses. Noncompete agreements are 
litigated throughout the country, where courts must balance the employer’s 
interests in retaining customers and protecting trade secrets with the 
                                                                                                             
 22. Covenants Not to Compete, LEXIS ADVANCE (Jan. 2015), https://advance 
.lexis.com (access “LexisNexis® 50-State Surveys, Statutes & Regulations,” follow 
“Contract Law” hyperlink, then follow “Types of Contracts” hyperlink, then follow 
“Covenants Not to Compete” hyperlink).  
 23. See Daniel S. Terrell, Note, The Louisiana Legislature’s Response to 
SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond: The Noncompete Pendulum Swings 
Toward Debt Peonage. Will the Judiciary’s Answer Achieve the Fragile 
Employer–Employee Balance?, 64 LA. L. REV. 699, 700 (2004).  
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employee’s interest in having the personal freedom to work and 
maintaining his or her livelihood.24 
A. Noncompete Agreements Throughout the United States 
Employers and employees have competing interests in enforcing 
noncompete agreements,25 demonstrating that although these agreements 
are necessary, courts must reasonably enforce them.26 Employers view 
noncompete agreements as necessary to prevent competitors from gaining 
information about customers or trade secrets.27 Without noncompete 
agreements, employers would have to exhaust further resources and 
money to protect valuable information.28 Noncompete agreements also 
insulate employers from the risk of losing investment in employee 
training.29 For instance, once an employer trains an employee, that 
employee may have an incentive to use the newly acquired knowledge or 
skill to advance his or her own business or to benefit a competitor.30 
Therefore, businesses need noncompete agreements to protect sensitive 
information and their legitimate financial investment in the training of 
employees.31 
Employees, however, view noncompete agreements as restricting their 
right to utilize the free market in search of employment.32 Commentators 
have noted the lack of mutuality of performance for noncompete 
agreements signed by an at-will employee—an employer can fire an at-
will employee, but the employee has no freedom to find a similar job.33 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 
AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 178–85 (2008). 
 25. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 625, 626–27 (1960). 
 26. Id. at 648–49. 
 27. Id. at 627. 
 28. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 97 (1981). 
 29. Blake, supra note 25, at 627 (“Without the protection afforded by such 
covenants, it is argued, businessmen could not afford to stimulate research and 
improvement of business methods to a desirably high level, nor could they achieve 
the degree of freedom of communication within a company that is necessary for 
efficient operation.”). 
 30. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 28, at 97.  
 31. Id. at 99.  
 32. See Blake, supra note 25, at 650.  
 33. Lyon, supra note 17, at 610–11. Enforcing a noncompete agreement against 
an at-will employee indicates that the employer does not have to keep the employee, 
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This imbalance is particularly problematic for employees who practice a 
specific trade or have expertise in a field.34 Further, society has an interest 
in a free market with fair competition to foster innovation, which 
noncompete agreements inhibit when employers unnecessarily use them.35  
Considering these interests, the traditional common law approach to 
determine the validity of noncompete agreements is based on both 
demonstrating a protectable interest and reasonableness. An employer first 
“must demonstrate a legitimate commercial reason for any agreement not 
to compete to ensure that the agreement is not a naked attempt to restrict 
free competition.”36 If an employer prevails on that matter, the next 
question is whether the scope of the noncompete agreement is reasonable, 
which is limited by the type of activity, geographic area, and time.37  
B. Noncompete Agreements in Louisiana 
Like other states, Louisiana has generally disfavored noncompete 
agreements because they are contrary to public policy.38 Nonetheless, 
Louisiana courts and the Louisiana Legislature provide exceptions within 
which noncompete agreements are enforceable.39 Over the past 80 years, 
the Louisiana Legislature has continuously amended noncompete law to 
adhere to the changing pace and structure of the employment market.  
                                                                                                             
even though the employer can prevent the employee from working in his chosen 
field. Hendrik Hartog, Stone’s Transitions, 34 CONN. L. REV. 821, 823 (2002). 
 34. See generally Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition 
Agreements When Employment is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95 (1998). 
 35. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 24, at 114–15. 
 36. Id. at 115. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (1981); see also 
Garrison & Wendt, supra note 24, at 114. 
 38. See SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 298 (La. 
2001) (“Louisiana has long had a strong public policy disfavoring noncompetition 
agreements between employers and employees.”). 
 39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015) (“Any person . . . who is 
employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer to 
refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer 
and/or from soliciting customers of the employer within a specified parish or 
parishes, municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer 
carries on a like business therein, not to exceed a period of two years from 
termination of employment.”). 
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1. Louisiana’s Oscillating History of Noncompete Agreements 
Louisiana’s current law governing noncompete agreements is a 
product of the vacillating influences of the Louisiana Legislature and the 
Louisiana courts. Generally, the courts have restricted noncompete 
agreements, citing Louisiana’s public policy in favor of competition.40 The 
legislature, however, has often reacted to the jurisprudence by broadening 
the enforceability of noncompete agreements.  
Before 1934, the rules governing noncompete agreements in 
Louisiana were entirely judge-made, and the courts had a nearly per se rule 
against noncompete agreements.41 In 1934, the Louisiana Legislature 
endorsed the judiciary’s view of noncompete agreements and enacted the 
first noncompete statute, which declared any provision that restricted 
employment competition null.42 The statute expressly provided that the 
public policy of Louisiana is “that employers shall not require or direct 
their employees . . . to enter into any contract . . . [where] the employee 
agrees and contracts not to engage in any competing business for 
themselves or as the employee of another” after they are no longer 
employed with the employer.43 Following the statute, Louisiana courts 
consistently stated that the legislature’s intent was to provide a broad 
policy against all noncompete agreements.44  
                                                                                                             
 40. See, e.g., SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 298. The exception to Louisiana courts’ 
negative attitude toward restriction of competition is AMCOM of Louisiana v. 
Battson, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.), where the Louisiana Supreme Court 
reinstated the trial court’s allowance of reformation of overly broad noncompete 
agreements. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 41. M. Nan Alessandra & Barry L. LaCour, The Past, Present and Future of 
Noncompetition Agreements in Louisiana: A Drafter’s Dilemma, 49 LOY. L. REV. 
809, 812 (2003). 
 42. Act No. 133, 1934 La. Acts 484 (current version codified at LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 23:921); see also Alessandra & LaCour, supra note 41, at 813.  
 43. Act No. 133, 1934 La. Acts 484. The Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 
133 during the Great Depression and did not want to exclude individuals from 
employment at a time of economic turmoil. La. Smoked Prods., Inc. v. Savoie’s 
Sausage & Food Prods., Inc., 696 So. 2d 1373, 1379 (La. 1997); see also Albert 
O. “Chip” Saulsbury, IV, Devil Inside the Deal: An Examination of Louisiana 
Noncompete Agreements in Business Acquisitions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 713, 718–19 
(2012) (“The prohibition in the original statute was absolute, meaning any 
agreement by an employee not to compete with his employer was unreasonable 
per se.” (emphasis in original)). 
 44. See, e.g., Nelson v. Associated Branch Pilots of Port of Lake Charles, 63 
So. 2d 437, 439 (La. Ct. App. 1953); Baton Rouge Cigarette Serv., Inc. v. 
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In 1962, while still articulating the state’s public policy against 
noncompete agreements, the Louisiana Legislature amended the 
noncompete statute to include two exceptions to the general prohibition 
against those agreements.45 Section 23:921, as amended, allowed 
enforcement of noncompete agreements if an employer could show that it 
incurred a training expense or an expense in advertising.46 In Orkin 
Exterminating Co. v. Foti, the Louisiana Supreme Court imposed a judicial 
gloss on these two exceptions by requiring an employer to “invest[] 
substantial sums” in training employees to meet the exception.47 After 
Foti, lower courts adhered to the restrictive interpretation of the 1962 
amendment and disallowed many noncompete agreements, citing the 
public policy against noncompete agreements and in favor of 
competition.48 Thus, the Foti decision effectively rendered the 1962 
amendment meaningless.  
In reaction to the Foti Court’s narrow interpretation of section 23:921, 
the Louisiana Legislature again amended the statute in 1989.49 The 
legislature replaced the noncompete statute that the Court had narrowly 
interpreted with one that imposed concrete criteria for noncompete 
contracts. This was likely done to reduce the need to litigate noncompete 
agreements and to prevent the judiciary from overlying additional 
requirements. The amendment eliminated the requirement that the 
employer incur expenses for training employees or advertising the 
business for the agreement to be enforced and instead simply stated that 
“every” noncompete agreement was “null and void” unless it fell within 
limited statutory exceptions.50 The amendment allowed courts to enforce 
                                                                                                             
Bloomenstiel, 88 So. 2d 742, 744–45 (La. Ct. App. 1956); Marine Forwarding & 
Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. Ct. App. 1963). 
 45. Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251, 251–52, §§ 1, 2; see also Orkin 
Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. 1974) (stating that the purpose 
of the 1962 amendment was “to protect an employer only where he has invested 
substantial sums in special training of the employee or in advertising the 
employee’s connection with his business” (quoting Nat’l Motor Club of La., Inc. 
v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1965)) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West, Westlaw 1962). 
 47. Foti, 302 So. 2d at 597; Alessandra & LaCour, supra note 41, at 815–16. 
 48. Alessandra & LaCour, supra note 41, at 815–16. 
 49. Act No. 639, 1989 La. Acts 1836, 1836–37. 
 50. Id. Subsection C of the 1989 amendment states: 
A person who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree 
with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business 
similar to that of the employer and/or from soliciting customers of the 
employer within a specified parish or parishes, municipality or 
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noncompete agreements if the employee was engaged in a business similar 
to that of the employer, if the agreement specified a geographic restriction, 
and if the agreement restricted competition for no more than two years.51 
The legislature opted for specific exceptions to the per se rule of invalidity 
and sought to create certainty by specifying what constituted a valid 
noncompete agreement.52  
Although the legislature likely expected the specificity of the 1989 
amendment to decrease judicial discretion, two landmark Louisiana 
Supreme Court cases again changed the landscape of the enforceability of 
noncompete agreements in Louisiana. Traditionally, Louisiana courts did not 
permit reformation of overly broad noncompete agreements, adhering to a 
restrictive reading of section 23:921.53 In AMCOM, however, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s reformation of an overly broad 
noncompete agreement, which was a major shift from the Court’s previous 
restrictive reading of the statute.54 The ability to reform overly broad 
noncompete agreements gave courts wide discretion to decide whether a 
noncompete agreement is enforceable, notwithstanding the legislature’s 
express language that an overbroad noncompete agreement be struck down as 
invalid.  
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court’s apparent shift away from a 
restrictive interpretation of section 23:921 in AMCOM, the Court returned to 
its prior practice of narrowly construing the statute in SWAT 24 Shreveport 
Bossier, Inc. v. Bond.55 In SWAT 24, the Court interpreted the requirement 
of “carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer” 
in section 23:921 to mean that an employee could not engage in his own 
similar business, but was free to engage with an existing competitor.56 The 
Court reasoned that section 23:921(C), which requires the employee to be 
engaged in a business similar to that of the employer, is an exception to an 
otherwise prohibitive statute.57 Thus, noncompete agreements must be 
narrowly construed in favor of the employee.58 The Court also held that 
                                                                                                             
municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries on a like 
business therein, not to exceed a period of two years. 
Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See Alessandra & LaCour, supra note 41, at 816–17. 
 53. See, e.g., Comet Indus., Inc. v. Lawrence, 600 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
 54. 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.); see also infra Part II.B.2. 
 55. 808 So. 2d 294 (La. 2001). 
 56. Id. at 296. 
 57. Id. at 298. 
 58. Id. The Court cited the public policy in section 23:921(A)(1), which 
stated that: “Every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by which anyone 
is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, 
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Louisiana’s public policy disfavors noncompete agreements.59 Thus, 
SWAT 24 applied a strict construction of the statute, which resulted in 
courts refusing to enforce noncompete agreements that did not fit into one 
of the exceptions.60  
In response to SWAT 24, the Louisiana Legislature again amended 
section 23:921 in 2003 to include a new subsection, which states that a 
noncompete agreement is enforceable even when the employee is engaged 
in a similar, competing business.61 This amendment effectively overruled 
SWAT 24’s ruling that a person is only “carrying on or engaging in a 
business similar to that of the employer” if that person is working at his 
own business.62 Thus, although courts continue to articulate Louisiana’s 
strong public policy against noncompete agreements, statutory 
amendments to section 23:921 have actually increased the courts’ ability 
to enforce noncompete agreements.63  
                                                                                                             
except as provided in this Section, shall be null and void.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 23:921(A)(1) (West, Westlaw 2001) (emphasis added). 
 59. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 298. The holding of SWAT 24 seemed to clarify 
that noncompete agreements are usually enforced only when “the facts of the case 
[make] it very clear that the former employee who had executed a noncompete 
agreement had engaged in some type of unfair conduct that should be redressed 
by the courts.” Alessandra & LaCour, supra note 41, at 833. 
 60. See, e.g., Kimball v. Anesthesia Specialists of Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 
2d 405 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Aon Risk Servs. of La., Inc. v. Ryan, 807 So. 2d 1058 
(La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 61. Act No. 428, 2003 La. Acts 1791 (“For the purposes of Subsections B 
and C, a person who becomes employed by a competing business, regardless of 
whether or not that person is an owner or equity interest holder of that competing 
business, may be deemed to be carrying on or engaging in a business similar to 
that of the party having a contractual right to prevent that person from 
competing.”). The new subsection is Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
23:921(D). 
 62. Terrell, supra note 23, at 715. Justice Traylor’s dissent in SWAT 24 
essentially invited the legislature to legislatively overrule the majority opinion. 
He stated that the ruling “construe[d] the statute so narrowly that effectively no 
competitive agreements [could] be enforced, and [the majority’s opinion] 
completely ignore[d] the competitive realities of today’s commercial world.” 
SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 310 (Traylor, J., dissenting). 
 63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015). 
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2. Requirements of an Enforceable Noncompete Agreement Under 
Section 23:921 
The current version of 23:921 provides that a noncompete agreement 
shall be null and void unless it meets three requirements.64 First, the 
agreement can only restrict competition for two years.65 Second, the 
agreement must specify the parishes or municipalities in which the 
employee is restricted from competing.66 With respect to this requirement, 
Louisiana’s courts of appeal agree that noncompete agreements must 
specify the parishes or municipalities in which the employer does 
business,67 although some circuits disagree about what “specify” means.68 
Third, the agreement must restrict an employee only from working in a 
competing business.69 The relevant part of the statute reads: “[An 
employee] may agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or 
engaging in a business similar to that of the employer.”70 Louisiana courts 
are uncertain about whether a valid noncompete agreement must define 
the business in which the employee is restricted from competing, despite 
the fact that the statute does not explicitly require a definition of the 
business.71  
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. at § 23:921(C).  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. See, e.g., Action Revenue Recovery, L.L.C. v. eBusiness Grp., L.L.C., 17 
So. 3d 999, 1003–04 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 
2d 247, 257–58 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Aon Risk Servs. of La., Inc. v. Ryan, 807 
So. 2d 1058, 1060–61 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Kimball v. Anesthesia Specialists of 
Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 2d 405, 411–12 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Turner Prof’l 
Servs., Ltd. v. Broussard, 762 So. 2d 184, 185 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Cellular One, 
Inc. v. Boyd, 653 So. 2d 30, 33 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Water Processing Techs., 
Inc. v. Ridgeway, 618 So. 2d 533, 536 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 68. Compare Aon Risk Servs. of La., Inc., 807 So. 2d 1058 (reasoning that the 
legislature did not intend for the word “specify” to be a general, catch-all phrase, 
but instead intended “specify” to mean that the agreement had to name the 
parishes in which the employer does business), with Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. 
v. Untereker, 731 So. 2d 965 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the agreement was 
enforceable if the parishes could be inferred from where the employer conducted 
business). 
 69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Compare LaFourche Speech & Language Servs., Inc. v. Juckett, 652 So. 
2d 679 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (declaring a noncompete agreement that tracked the 
language of the statute unenforceable because it did not adequately define the 
business of the employer), with Baton Rouge Computer Sales, Inc. v. Miller-
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Thus, Louisiana provides employers and employees with distinct 
requirements in a detailed statute. Even though the concrete nature of the 
statute seems to provide clear guidance to employers drafting noncompete 
agreements, there are still gaps in the statute that cause these agreements 
to be over broad and over used. Louisiana’s doctrine of nullity is one 
remedy for the harms that invalid noncompete agreements cause, although 
whether the doctrine provides effective relief is uncertain.  
II. THE DOCTRINE OF NULLITY AS APPLIED TO 
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS 
Louisiana adopted the modern French theory of nullity in the 1984 
revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, recognizing the difference between 
absolute and relative nullities.72 Absolute nullities are nullities of public 
order,73 such as a juridical act that is against the state’s public policy.74  
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921 declares overly broad 
noncompete agreements to be “null and void.”75 Overly broad noncompete 
agreements are absolute nullities because they are contrary to Louisiana’s 
public policy in favor of competition and a person’s freedom of 
employment.76 An employer who drafts an overly broad noncompete 
agreement derogates from this public policy, so the agreement is 
absolutely null.77 Because overly broad noncompete agreements are 
absolutely null, the remedies afforded for a violation of section 23:921 are 
also derived from the law of nullity. Louisiana’s nullity doctrine 
recognizes three remedies: refusing to enforce the null agreement via 
                                                                                                             
Conrad, 767 So. 2d 763 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the law does not require 
a specific definition of the business). See also Jacob Ecker, At the Breaking Point: 
Adapting Louisiana Employment Noncompete Law to the Information Age, 75 LA. 
L. REV. 1317 (2015). 
 72. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Rethinking the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 
663, 671–72 (2014). 
 73. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2030–2032 (2016). Absolute nullities are those 
that affect all members of society, cannot be confirmed, and can be invoked by 
any person. Id. art. 2033 (“An absolutely null contract, or a relatively null contract 
that has been declared null by the court, is deemed never to have existed.”). 
 74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 7. An act that is contrary to public policy is also 
bilaterally null, meaning it affects both parties to the contract. Id. art. 1968. 
 75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921. 
 76. See SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294 (La. 2001). 
 77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (“Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate 
from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation 
of such laws is an absolute nullity.”). 
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dissolution, issuing damages caused by the null agreement when 
dissolution is impracticable, or reforming the null agreement.78 
A. Dissolution and Damages: Louisiana Civil Code Article 2033 and Its 
Application to Noncompete Agreements 
The traditional remedy for a null agreement is dissolution of the 
contract.79 Louisiana Civil Code article 2018 provides the effects of 
dissolution of a null agreement, which mirror the effects of nullity in article 
2033. Article 2018 states that upon dissolution, the court should restore the 
parties to their pre-contractual state.80 Dissolution of an overly broad 
noncompete agreement by itself is not a sufficient remedy for an employee 
because the employee’s pre-contractual state was unemployment. Simply 
declaring that the agreement is invalid does not provide full recourse for an 
employee who has already lost a job opportunity because of an overly broad 
noncompete agreement or a current employee who signs an updated 
noncompete agreement in fear of losing his or her job. Fortunately, 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2033 provides for restitution when simple 
dissolution of the agreement is insufficient.81 
Although dissolution of the contract is the favored remedy for 
absolutely null contracts,82 in situations like overly broad noncompete 
agreements—where dissolution of the contract does not adequately remedy 
the harm suffered by one of the parties—the court may order damages.83 
The former employee, however, will not be able to recover damages if that 
employee had actual or constructive knowledge that the noncompete 
agreement was overly broad.84 In the absence of such knowledge, the former 
employee may be able to recover damages in addition to having the 
agreement dissolved.85  
                                                                                                             
 78. See id. art. 2033. Because the remedies of dissolution and damages are 
interrelated, this Comment will discuss them together. 
 79. See SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, § 16.77, in 5 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 532–33 (2d ed. 2001). 
 80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2018 (“Upon dissolution of a contract, the parties shall 
be restored to the situation that existed before the contract was made. If restoration 
in kind is impossible or impracticable, the court may award damages.”). 
 81. Id. art. 2033. 
 82. Davis v. Parker, 58 F.3d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at art. 2033 cmt. d. 
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1. Application of Article 2033: Restoring a Party through Damages 
In the case of overly broad noncompete agreements, dissolution alone 
will likely not provide complete restitution. Courts, however, have wide 
discretion as to how damages are to be allocated to restore the parties to 
the position they were in before the agreement. Very few cases have 
awarded damages to victims of overly broad noncompete agreements. 
Thus, examining similar scenarios in which courts have awarded damages 
when dissolution was impracticable could be helpful to understand how a 
court may allocate damages to a victim of an absolutely null noncompete 
agreement.  
Louisiana courts have awarded damages under Louisiana Civil Code 
article 2033 when restoring a party in kind is impossible or 
impracticable.86 Courts have applied article 2033 when they have deemed 
a contract to be an absolute nullity because a professional involved in the 
construction of a building was improperly licensed.87 Upon deeming the 
contracts null, the courts found that restoring the parties in kind88 was 
impracticable because the buildings had already been built.89 Therefore, 
courts have instead awarded damages to the aggrieved parties for the 
amount of the cost of repair or the amount that the contractor was paid to 
do the work.  
Courts have also applied article 2033 when the object of a contract is 
illicit or immoral,90 finding that a person who acts in bad faith should not 
be restored to his pre-contractual state.91 Further, courts will not award 
damages if the parties knew or should have known of the defect that caused 
                                                                                                             
 86. See, e.g., Touro Infirmary v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., No. 06-
3535, 2008 WL 3975605 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2008) (restoration in kind was not 
practicable for a building built pursuant to a null contract, so the court awarded 
monetary damages). 
 87. These cases often involve buildings that were constructed pursuant to an 
invalid construction contract because the contractor lacked requisite licensure. 
See, e.g., id. at *8; First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Omega Contractors, Inc., No. 
11-2294, 2014 WL 1329899, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2014). 
 88. Restoration “in kind” is restoration “[i]n goods or services rather than 
money.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (9th ed. 2009).  
 89. See, e.g., Touro Infirmary, 2008 WL 3975605, at *8; First Hartford 
Realty Corp., 2014 WL 1329899, at *2–3. 
 90. See, e.g., Dugas v. Dugas, 804 So. 2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (where 
father transferred property to his daughter in an effort to escape collection from 
his creditors); Moore v. Smith, 521 So. 2d 742, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (where 
children renounced their future interest in their still-living mother’s succession, 
understanding that their father would leave the property to them in his will). 
 91. See Dugas, 804 So. 2d at 882. 
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the nullity. For example, in Pique Severn Avenue Partnership v. Ballen,92 
the court did not grant damages to a lessor who made a claim against a real 
estate broker for the return of commissions paid because the lessor should 
have known that the broker did not have a license.93  
Although courts have awarded damages due to an absolutely null 
contract in other areas of Louisiana law, the doctrine’s application in the 
employment context remains uncertain. The Kimball case explored the 
applicability of article 2033 damages to overly broad noncompete 
agreements.  
2. Restoring the Employee Through Article 2033: Kimball v. 
HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana 
used article 2033 to recognize the possibility of damages for Catherine 
Kimball for the harm that her employer’s overly broad noncompete 
agreement caused.94 Originally, the court granted HCF’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that article 2033 did not apply to the 
employment contract because the overly broad noncompete agreement 
was not an absolute nullity.95 In the ruling on Kimball’s motion to alter or 
amend the judgment, the court found its own ruling manifestly erroneous 
and held that the noncompete agreement at issue was an absolute nullity.96 
The court further held that damages under article 2033 were available to 
Kimball.97 
HCF conceded that the noncompete agreement in Kimball’s employment 
contract was overly broad and in contravention of section 23:921,98 but HCF 
contended that severing and dissolving only the violative portions of the 
agreement was the proper remedy.99 The court, however, reasoned that 
because the noncompete agreement did not comply with the requirements 
                                                                                                             
 92. 773 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 93. Id. at 181. 
 94. See Kimball v. HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., No. 12–395, 2013 WL 
4782139 (M.D. La. Sept. 5, 2013). 
 95. Id. at *1. 
 96. Id. at *2. In the initial ruling that granted HEALTHCAREfirst’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the court reasoned that Kimball’s reliance on Louisiana 
Civil Code articles 2030 and 2033 was misplaced because she could not prove 
that the contract could be invalidated in its entirety. Ruling on Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Kimball v. HEALTHCAREfirst, Inc., No. 12-395 (M.D. 
La. Sept. 5, 2013), 2013 WL 4782139. 
 97. Kimball, 2013 WL 4782139, at *3. 
 98. Id. at *2.  
 99. Id.  
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of section 23:921, the obligation suffered from an unlawful cause.100 The 
court further found that the overly broad noncompete agreement was a 
“juridical act in derogation of a law enacted to protect a strong Louisiana 
public policy” and was therefore absolutely null.101 Despite HCF’s 
argument to the contrary, the court found that nullity of one clause in the 
contract was enough to trigger an article 2033 analysis.102 
After finding that article 2033 applied because of the severed 
provision’s absolute nullity, the court held that Kimball could seek 
damages and “be restored to the situation that existed before the contract 
was made.”103 To obtain damages under article 2033, Kimball would have 
had to “establish that the absolutely null clause actually caused her some 
form of damages, such as causing her to lose a job opportunity.”104 The 
court denied the HCF’s motion for summary judgment because Kimball 
“establish[ed] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the absolutely 
null provisions caused her to lose a job opportunity, and thus, sustain 
damages.”105 Soon after the ruling, Kimball and HCF settled for the 
amount of wages lost during litigation.106 Because Kimball was not 
decided on the merits, the grounds on which a court will award damages 
under article 2033 for an overly broad noncompete agreement remains 
undetermined. 
Although article 2033 may technically apply, damages under article 
2033 are difficult to prove. Even if an employee could prove causation, 
the damages caused by an overly broad noncompete agreement are 
speculative because the employee has lost the continuing benefit of 
employment instead of some specific value gained in the past. Like 
dissolution of the agreement, restitution through article 2033 damages also 
proves to be an insufficient remedy. The third remedy to an absolutely null 
agreement—reformation—also provides little relief. 
                                                                                                             
 100. See id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1968 (2016) (“The cause of an 
obligation is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would produce a 
result prohibited by law or against public policy.”). 
 101. Kimball, 2013 WL 4782139, at *2. The court held that only the 
noncompete clause, which could be severed, was null, rather than the entire 
employment agreement. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 7. 
 102. Kimball, 2013 WL 4782139, at *3. 
 103. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033 (Supp. 2013)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 104. Id. at *4. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Interview with Amy Newsom, supra note 2. The case settled minutes 
after Judge Brady’s ruling. Id. HCF paid Kimball an amount that reflected her lost 
earnings from the time she was terminated until she was denied employment due 
to the noncompete agreement. Id. 
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B. Reformation of Contractual Instruments 
Like dissolution and restitution, reformation is a remedy to nullity that 
Louisiana courts employ.107 The reformation of a contract allows the 
contract to remain in existence, but not by its original terms.108 Courts have 
historically utilized this remedy to reform deeds, but in recent years have 
used reformation to preserve otherwise invalid noncompete agreements.109  
Louisiana Civil Code article 2034 limits the scope of nullity, stating 
that “[n]ullity of a provision does not [necessarily] render the whole 
contract null.”110 Thus, severing the null provision while leaving the 
remainder of the agreement intact may be possible.111 A court may only 
sever a null provision if, after looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
it determines that the parties still would have made the contract without 
the null provision.112 Historically, courts used the reformation of a contract 
to correct an error made in the drafting of a contract.113 In the context of 
noncompete agreements, however, Louisiana courts adopted the use of 
reformation from other states’ use of common law doctrine instead of 
applying traditional civilian principles. 
1. Reformation of Noncompete Agreements Throughout the United 
States 
Many states reform overly broad noncompete agreements based on 
different approaches.114 Some states employ a “blue pencil” approach, 
                                                                                                             
 107. See LITVINOFF, supra note 79, § 16.77, at 532–33. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Jaime E. Diaz, Reformation of Instruments in Louisiana, 30 TUL. L. REV 
486, 489–90 (1956). 
 110. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2034 (2016). 
 111. See id.  
 112. Id. The provision can be severed if “from the nature of the provision or 
the intention of the parties, it can be presumed that the contract would not have 
been made without the null provision.” Id. The comment to article 2034 directs 
courts to “consider the totality of the parties’ intentions before annulling the 
agreement when only a portion of [the agreement] is null.” Id. at cmt. a. 
 113. See Saúl Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an 
Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1989); see Peironnet v. Matador Res. 
Co., 144 So. 3d 791, 816–17 (La. 2013); Wilson v. Levy, 101 So. 2d 214, 215 
(La. 1958); see also Diaz, supra note 109, at 487 (“The English and American 
courts reform only written instruments, but the French courts allow the correction 
of an error of computation in an oral contract. The Louisiana courts have applied 
the English and American theory of reformation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 114. Lyon, supra note 17, at 628.  
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according to which courts strike the overly broad portion of an agreement, 
but do not rewrite any other part of the agreement.115 In Indiana, courts 
remove unreasonable restrictions if they are divisible, meaning the court 
can only remove the offending language if doing so does not change the 
meaning of the remainder of the agreement.116 Similarly, Arizona courts 
will strike unreasonable provisions of an agreement that can be 
grammatically severed.117 In these states, if the offending portion of the 
agreement cannot be severed, the court will render the entire agreement 
void.118 
Some states employ a more liberal reformation approach, reforming 
the agreement by making “reasonable alteration[s]” that reflect the intent 
of the parties.119 These courts effectively rewrite overly broad agreements 
to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the employer.120 In New 
Jersey, courts enforce noncompete agreements to the extent that they are 
reasonable as long as enforcement does not cause injury to the public or 
injustice to the parties.121 Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire similarly enforce overly broad noncompete agreements by 
modifying the agreement to be reasonable.122 Courts in these states are not 
limited to grammatical or surgical severing of overly broad portions of an 
agreement, but can instead make substantial modifications to make the 
agreement fit within statutory or judicial requirements.123  
Other states, notably Georgia, Virginia, and Wisconsin, do not permit any 
reformation of overly broad noncompete agreements.124 For example, 
Wisconsin’s noncompete statute states: “Any covenant [not to compete] . . . 
imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as 
to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint.”125 In Georgia, noncompete agreements are unenforceable if any 
                                                                                                             
 115. Id. The “blue-pencil test” is defined as a “judicial standard for deciding 
whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the offending words.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 88, at 196. One Georgia court stated that “the ‘blue 
pencil’ marks, but it does not write.” Hamrick v. Kelley, 392 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 
1990). 
 116. Pivateau, supra note 14, at 683–84. 
 117. Id. at 684. 
 118. Id. at 684–85. 
 119. Lyon, supra note 17, at 628.  
 120. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 24, at 111.  
 121. Pivateau, supra note 14, at 687.  
 122. Id. at 687–88. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 682.  
 125. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2014). 
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provision of the agreement is “unreasonable either in time, territory, or 
prohibited business activity.”126 Similarly, courts in Virginia have refused to 
modify overly broad noncompete agreements and have tended to render these 
agreements unenforceable when they contain any ambiguous language.127 
Louisiana once prohibited reformation of noncompete agreements, but 
currently reforms agreements that contain a severability clause. 
2. Reforming Noncompete Agreements in Louisiana: AMCOM of 
Louisiana v. Battson128 
Prior to 1996, Louisiana courts narrowly read section 23:921 and were 
generally unwilling to reform overly broad noncompete agreements. In 
Comet Industries, Inc. v. Lawrence,129 the Louisiana Second Circuit Court 
of Appeal refused to reform an overly broad noncompete agreement that 
prohibited the employee from competing with the employer anywhere in 
the continental United States.130 The Comet court reasoned that the statute 
“plainly says [noncompete agreements] are against public policy” and 
therefore “must strictly comply with the requirements contained in the 
statute.”131 The United States Fifth Circuit and other Louisiana courts have 
come to similar conclusions.132 
In 1996, however, the AMCOM Court deviated from the strict 
application of 23:921 by allowing for reformation of an overly broad 
noncompete agreement.133 The agreement restricted Battson, the former 
employee of the radio station, from competing “in Shreveport or Bossier 
City, Louisiana, or in Caddo or Bossier Parishes, Louisiana, or within a 
seventy-five (75) mile radius of Shreveport or Bossier City, Louisiana.”134 
                                                                                                             
 126. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 277 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1981). 
 127. See, e.g., Lanmark Tech., Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. 
Va. 2006).  
 128. AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.). 
 129. 600 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
 130. Id. at 87. 
 131. Id. at 87–88. 
 132. See, e.g., Team Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Addison, 2 F.3d 124, 126–27 (5th 
Cir. 1993); see also Maritech Commercial, Inc. v. Quddus, No. 13-0613, 2014 
WL 2624944 (E.D. La. Jun. 12, 2014); Plunk v. LKQ Birmingham, Inc., No. 12-
2680, 2013 WL 5913755 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2013); Ferrellgas, L.P. v. 
McConathy, No. 1:10-cv-00178, 2010 WL 1010831 (W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2010); 
Kimball v. Anesthesia Specialists of Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 2d 405 (La. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 133. See AMCOM, 670 So. 2d at 1223. 
 134. AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (La. Ct. App. 
1996). 
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The trial court found AMCOM’s noncompete agreement geographically 
overly broad and in violation of section 23:921.135 The court deemed the 
language “or within a seventy-five (75) mile radius of Shreveport or 
Bossier City, Louisiana” overly broad, and used the severability clause to 
strike the offending language and leave the remainder of the agreement 
enforceable.136  
The court of appeal agreed that the agreement was geographically 
overly broad,137 but also found that the existence of a severability clause 
did not automatically allow a court to reform a noncompete agreement.138 
The court reasoned that reformation of an unenforceable noncompete 
agreement is contrary to Louisiana’s public policy in favor of 
competition.139 Further, the court found that reformation of noncompete 
agreements “run[s] counter to the requirement of strict and narrow 
construction of the statute,” and would ultimately lead to “uncertainty as 
to the validity and scope of what an employee has agreed to.”140 The 
dissent pointed out, however, that although Louisiana law does not favor 
reformation that requires judicial rewriting of a contract, courts are not 
prohibited from severing invalid portions of a noncompete agreement if 
the remaining text results in an enforceable contract.141  
In a two-sentence ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s ruling 
without further explanation.142 After AMCOM, Louisiana courts took 
varied approaches to reformation. 
Five years later, the SWAT 24 Court held that a severability clause “did 
not require a court to reform, redraft, or create a new agreement,” but 
instead “required only that the offending portion of the agreement be 
severed.”143 Since SWAT 24, most Louisiana courts have employed this 
                                                                                                             
 135. Id. at 1228. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1229. 
 138. Id. (“[A] ‘savings clause’ stating that any provision in an employment 
agreement found excessively broad would be limited [or reduced] to what was 
permitted by applicable law does not allow a court to reform a noncompetition 
provision to the geographical area permitted by [Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section] 23:921.”). 
 139. See id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1230–31 (Hightower, J., dissenting). 
 142. AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.) 
(“Judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. Judgment of the trial court is 
reinstated.”). 
 143. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 309 (La. 
2001).  
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“blue pencil” approach to reformation, severing overly broad geographic 
restrictions and leaving the remainder of the agreement enforceable.144 
Other courts have refused to reform noncompete contracts because doing 
so would either rewrite the contract or leave no remaining agreement.145 
The current practice of Louisiana courts is to sever overly broad 
portions of a noncompete agreement only if the agreement contains a 
severability clause.146 Even then, the courts will only sever the overly 
broad portion if they can do so without having to rewrite any part of the 
agreement.147 According to most Louisiana courts, extending the 
reformation of noncompete agreements to rewriting the contract would 
disrespect the intent of the parties.148 The overuse of the practice of 
reformation, however, may incentivize employers to write overly broad 
noncompete agreements in the hope that courts will remedy such 
agreements without consequence to the employer.149 Unfortunately, until 
a court rules these overly broad restrictions invalid, employees will likely 
abide by them150 because employees may be ignorant that these 
agreements are invalid or may lack the ability to sue. Therefore, 
reformation of noncompete agreements is an insufficient and inequitable 
remedy for an employee harmed by an overly broad noncompete 
agreement. 
C. Lost in the Nebulous Web of Nullity 
Resorting to nullity law to remedy the harms caused by an overly 
broad noncompete agreement produces unsatisfactory results. Dissolution 
of noncompete agreements is an inadequate solution because it does not 
                                                                                                             
 144. See, e.g., Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247 (La. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 145. See, e.g., Maritech Commercial, Inc. v. Quddus, No. 13-0613, 2014 WL 
2624944 (E.D. La. Jun. 12, 2014); Plunk v. LKQ Birmingham, Inc., No. 12-2680, 
2013 WL 5913755 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2013); Ferrellgas, L.P. v. McConathy, No. 
1:10-cv-00178, 2010 WL 1010831 (W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2010); Kimball v. 
Anesthesia Specialists of Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 2d 405, 413 (La. Ct. App. 
2001).  
 146. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 309. 
 147. See, e.g., id.; L & B Transp., LLC v. Beech, 568 F. Supp. 2d 689, 698 
(M.D. La. 2009); Kimball, 809 So. 2d at 413. 
 148. See, e.g., Gearheard v. De Puy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-1091, 
1999 WL 638582, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1999) (refusing to reform a 
noncompete agreement beyond the blue pencil approach because to do so would 
“delve into the parties’ actions and minds for interpretation”). 
 149. Team Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Addison, 2 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 150. Id.; Maritech, 2014 WL 2624944, at *2.  
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completely restore the employee to his or her pre-contractual state. 
Restitution via damages under article 2033 for a lost benefit, as discussed 
in Kimball, are an inadequate remedy because the damages will be 
speculative and difficult to prove. Likewise, judicial reformation of overly 
broad noncompete agreements is an unsuitable remedy for the employee, 
because the court’s reformation of the overly broad noncompete 
agreement often occurs after the employee has suffered a harm, such as 
the loss of a job. Reformation also leaves the employee uncertain as to 
whether the agreement can be enforced at all. 
III. LEGAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO OVERUSED AND 
OVERLY BROAD NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS 
Not only does Louisiana’s law fail to remedy harms caused by invalid 
noncompete agreements, current law also contributes to the problems that 
plague them. Reformation causes uncertainty regarding a noncompete 
agreement’s enforceability. This reality may even incentivize employers 
to intentionally draft overly broad agreements.151 Also, the lack of a 
protectable interest requirement in the statute leads to the overuse of 
noncompete agreements by restricting employees from competing even 
where the employer has no interest in protecting its customer base, trade 
secrets, or expertise.152  
A. Overly Broad Noncompete Agreements 
The judicial reformation of overly broad noncompete agreements 
leads to uncertainty about the enforceability of these agreements and 
incentivizes employers to draft illegal agreements without fearing any 
consequences.153 Reformation is not without merit, however, as the 
doctrine allows businesses to remain protected when they expand into new 
                                                                                                             
 151. See Team Envtl. Servs., 2 F.3d at 127.  
 152. For an example of a sandwich shop requiring their sandwich makers and 
delivery drivers to sign noncompete agreements, see Class and Collective Action 
Complaint, supra note 18, and Memorandum Opinion, supra note 18. A Louisiana 
daiquiri shop also required its employees to sign noncompete agreements. 
Daiquiri’s III on Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh, 608 So. 2d 222 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
The agreement prohibited employees from working in any place that sold “frozen 
drinks for consumption by the general public.” Id. at 223. Even though the court 
in Daiquiri’s ultimately deemed the noncompete agreement invalid, it is possible 
that the employees were restricted, de facto, from competing during the time that 
their employment ceased from the time the court ruled the agreement invalid. 
 153. See Pivateau, supra note 14, at 674. 
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areas. If the location of a business’s operation changes from the time of 
the signing of a noncompete agreement, a court can reform the agreement 
to reflect the scope of the restriction at the time of the employee’s 
termination. Reformation may also allow courts to maintain the intention 
of the parties to the agreement by severing overly broad language.154  
Unfortunately, reformation also strips the detailed noncompete statute 
of predictability and creates uncertainty for employees who should be 
aware of the restrictions placed on them at the time they sign the 
agreement. Further, because noncompete agreements are contrary to 
Louisiana’s public policy, reformation of noncompete agreements 
“place[s] courts in the business of either saving or writing a contract that 
is not generally favored by law.”155 To remedy the problem of uncertainty 
that overly broad noncompete agreements cause, Louisiana should either 
alter the current reformation doctrine or eliminate it altogether.156  
B. Overuse of Noncompete Agreements 
Under current noncompete law, employers pervasively use 
noncompete agreements because there is no downside—the employer 
faces no harm in drafting these agreements even if competition does not 
jeopardize its interests. In Louisiana, any business can draft an enforceable 
noncompete agreement as long as the agreement complies with the 
requirements of section 23:921.157 Because the statute does not require the 
employer to articulate a reason to restrain the employee from 
competition—often called a protectable or legitimate interest—employers 
are drafting noncompete agreements to restrict any employee, regardless 
of the employee’s specialized skill or ability to advantage competitors.158 
1. Protectable Interest Requirement in Other Jurisdictions 
Most states apply a two-part test to determine whether a noncompete 
agreement is enforceable.159 First, courts require an employer to show why 
restricting an employee from competition is necessary, meaning the 
employer must demonstrate a protectable interest.160 States consider a 
                                                                                                             
 154. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 24, at 130. 
 155. Gearheard v. De Puy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-1091, 1999 WL 
638582, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1999). 
 156. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 157. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015); see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 158. See supra note 152.  
 159. Lembrich, supra note 1, at 2301.  
 160. Id. 
2016] COMMENT 1261 
 
 
 
variety of factors when determining what constitutes a protectable interest, 
such as the protection of trade secrets, customer bases, and expertise 
gained during employment.161 Second, courts require a noncompete 
agreement to be reasonable in its duration and area of restriction.162  
Regardless of whether a states’ noncompete statute or jurisprudential 
rule is broad or whether it provides detailed requirements for restricting 
competition, most states require some form of a protectable interest.163 
Like Louisiana, Florida has a detailed noncompete statute, but the Florida 
statute also contains a non-exhaustive list of acceptable protectable 
interests.164 Once an employer demonstrates a legitimate business interest 
in restraining the employee, the employee then has the burden of showing 
that the restriction is not reasonably necessary.165 Using a different 
approach, Wisconsin has a broad statute, which states that a noncompete 
agreement is enforceable “only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the employer or principal.”166 Wisconsin 
courts have interpreted the statute to require both that an employer must 
                                                                                                             
 161. Kyle B. Sill, Drafting Effective Noncompete Clauses and Other Restrictive 
Covenants: Considerations Across the United States, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 
365, 384–85 (2013). 
 162. Lembrich, supra note 1, at 2301. 
 163. Sill, supra note 161, at 384–89. 
 164. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (1996). The relevant part of the statute reads:  
The person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant shall plead and 
prove the existence of one or more legitimate business interests 
justifying the restrictive covenant. The term “legitimate business 
interest” includes, but is not limited to: 
1. Trade secrets . . . . 
2. Valuable confidential business or professional information that 
otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets. 
3. Substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing 
customers, patients, or clients. 
4. Customer, patient, or client goodwill associated with: 
  a. An ongoing business or professional practice, by way of trade 
name, trademark, service mark, or “trade dress”; 
  b. A specific geographic location; or 
  c. A specific marketing or trade area. 
5. Extraordinary or specialized training. 
Any restrictive covenant not supported by a legitimate business interest 
is unlawful and is void and unenforceable. 
Id. 
 165. Frank J. Cavico, “Extraordinary or Specialized Training” as a “Legitimate 
Business Interest” in Restrictive Covenant Employment Law: Florida and National 
Perspectives, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 53, 64 (2001).  
 166. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2014).  
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demonstrate a protectable interest—usually the protection of its customer 
base, trade secrets, employee expertise, or confidential information—and 
that the protectable interest is reasonable.167 The courts determine the 
reasonableness of the protectable interest in light of the duration and 
geographic restrictions of the noncompete agreement.168 The protectable 
interest requirement deters employers from using noncompete agreements 
because they must justify a legitimate reason for restricting the employee. 
2. Louisiana’s Battle with Certainty and Fairness 
The conflict between certainty in enforceability and individual 
fairness in noncompete law drives the back-and-forth between Louisiana 
courts and the legislature on how to apply Louisiana’s noncompete law. A 
statute without specific requirements for demonstrating a protectable 
interest leads to an increased chance of inequitable results because the 
parties must rely on the courts to determine the enforceability of agreements 
on a case-by-case basis.169 The courts, however, would be more likely to 
reach fair results if the employer were required to demonstrate a legitimate 
reason for the restraint.170  
On the other hand, a detailed statute with specific requirements, like the 
current version of section 23:921, provides employers with certainty of how 
to draft a noncompete agreement. An employer knows exactly what to 
include in a noncompete agreement to make it enforceable, and employees 
should be able to determine if an agreement is valid on its face. A detailed 
statute should also decrease the need for litigation to determine whether 
an agreement is enforceable. This specific statute trades certainty for 
inflexibility—and therefore potential unfairness—however, because 
employers are not required to prove to the court why an employee should 
be restrained from competition.  
Before the legislature drafted the noncompete statute, Louisiana’s 
stance on noncompete law favored equity, as courts would decide the 
enforceability of a noncompete agreement on a case-by-case basis and 
would determine enforceability based on reasonableness, which often 
included an inquiry into the justification of the employer’s restriction.171 
Forcing employers to justify enforcing a noncompete agreement by 
                                                                                                             
 167. See, e.g., Runzheimer Int’l, Ltd. v. Friedlen, 862 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. 2015). 
 168. Ralph Anzivino, Drafting Restrictive Covenants in Employment 
Contracts, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 499, 544 (2010). 
 169. See generally Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the 
Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in 
Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163 (2001). 
 170. See id. at 1181. 
 171. See Alessandra & LaCour, supra note 41, at 812–13.  
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proving training or advertising expenses, the 1962 amendment to section 
23:921 is the closest that the Louisiana Legislature has come to requiring 
a protectable interest.172 In the current version of Louisiana’s noncompete 
statute, however, the legislature settled on certainty, eliminating the need 
for an employer to demonstrate an interest in restraining the employee 
from competition.173 This use of a bright line rule for drafting noncompete 
agreements has led to their enforcement against employees of hair salons 
and daiquiri shops, for which the employer did not—and likely could 
not—provide a good reason to restrict competition.174 
Louisiana’s current noncompete law is inequitable to employees 
despite the supposedly strong public policy against noncompete 
agreements. The law’s defects are causing problems of overuse and 
overbreadth of these agreements, and the law therefore should be amended 
to provide employees with an avenue for recovery for harms suffered. This 
is especially necessary because employees find little recourse in 
Louisiana’s nullity doctrine. As such, providing employees with a 
sufficient and equitable remedy will require a joint effort from the 
Louisiana Legislature and the Louisiana Supreme Court. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE OVERLY BROAD AND OVERUSED 
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS 
Because the remedies that the nullity doctrine affords do not provide 
relief from the deficiencies in Louisiana’s noncompete statute, both the 
Louisiana Legislature and the Louisiana Supreme Court must act. An array 
of solutions to equalize the threat of noncompete agreements exist for both 
employers and employees. While all of these proposed solutions should be 
adopted, implementing any one of the solutions will provide a more 
equitable balance to the parties of a noncompete agreement. 
A. A Legislative Solution: Overhaul Louisiana’s Noncompete Law 
The legislature should amend section 23:921 to prohibit the reformation 
of noncompete agreements. This would remove the employers’ incentives 
to draft overly broad noncompete agreements and infuse certainty to 
noncompete law. Further, to remedy the overuse of noncompete 
                                                                                                             
 172. Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251, 251–52 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:921 (West, Westlaw 1962)). 
 173. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015). 
 174. See, e.g., H2O Hair, Inc. v. Marquette, 960 So. 2d 250 (La. Ct. App. 2007); 
John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Preskitt, 898 So. 2d 538 (La. Ct. App. 2005); 
Daiquiri’s III on Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh, 608 So. 2d 222 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
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agreements, the legislature should amend the statute and require employers 
to demonstrate a protectable interest in restricting the employee. 
1. Disincentivize Overbreadth of Noncompete Agreements: Eliminate 
Reformation 
To best remedy the uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of 
noncompete agreements, Louisiana should completely eliminate the 
reformation doctrine’s application to noncompete agreements. The 
Louisiana Legislature’s goal in adopting section 23:921(C) was to give 
clarity and certainty to noncompete law. The reformation doctrine, however, 
thwarts this purpose.175 When looking at a noncompete agreement, whether 
the agreement is enforceable should be immediately clear based on whether 
it complies with the requirements of 23:921. With the current doctrine of 
reformation, however, whether a noncompete agreement is enforceable on 
its face remains uncertain.176 Many issues frequently arise, such as whether 
the court will reform the agreement at all, what part or parts of the agreement 
the court will reform, and whether the court will infer any changes to the 
agreement. Therefore, the legislature should amend section 23:921 to 
expressly prohibit the reformation of overly broad noncompete agreements 
so that both employers and employees are clearly aware of the restrictions 
on competition. 
2. Curtail the Overuse of Noncompete Agreements: Require a 
Protectable Interest 
Another way to curtail the overuse of noncompete agreements in 
Louisiana would be for the Louisiana Legislature to amend the statute to 
require the employer to prove a protectable interest. This rationale reverts 
back to the purpose of the 1962 amendment,177 but under this new 
                                                                                                             
 175. Lembrich, supra note 1, at 2294.  
 176. Even Louisiana courts have noted that reformation runs counter to an 
employee’s interest and Louisiana’s requirement of strict construction of section 
23:921. See, e.g., Aon Risk Servs. of La., Inc. v. Ryan, 807 So. 2d 1058, 1062 
(La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the employee should know the extent of his 
restriction at the time of signing and “exactly what price he was being called upon 
to pay in exchange for employment”); Heart’s Desire, LLC v. Edwards, No. 
46,222–CA, 2011 WL 1630175, at *4 (La. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2011) (noting that 
reformation “allow[s] ambiguous noncompetition agreements”); Kimball v. 
Anesthesia Specialists of Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 2d 405, 413 (La. Ct. App. 
2001) (refusing to reform because a “non-compete clause must stand on its own”). 
 177. Act. No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251, 251–52. The 1962 amendment provided 
for enforcement of a noncompete agreement where the employer would show that 
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amendment, the legislature should require that the employer prove a 
protectable interest instead of only requiring the showing of training or 
advertising expenses. This requirement will likely reduce the use of 
noncompete agreements in Louisiana because requiring a protectable 
interest may give employers with dubious interests in restricting 
competition pause about using noncompete agreements.  
Admittedly, amending the statute to require an employer to state a 
protectable interest may initially increase the amount of litigation 
surrounding noncompete agreements, as courts must define and articulate 
what protectable interests are. Increased litigation, however, will not be a 
permanent problem because the courts will create jurisprudential 
definitions of what is deemed a valid protectable interest, and employers 
will begin drafting noncompete agreements in compliance with judicial 
standards. Although a period of increased litigation is not ideal, the 
protectable interest requirement is necessary to provide fairness to 
employees and to prevent the overuse of noncompete agreements in 
Louisiana. Providing distinct examples of protectable interests, such as 
those in the Florida noncompete statute, could help remedy this 
problem.178  
The legislature, however, may not be willing to amend section 23:921 
to disallow reformation and to include a protectable interest provision. 
After all, the legislature enacted such a provision in the 1962 amendment, 
but later removed it.179 Further, the legislature has not amended the statute 
since the 2003 amendment, despite extensive litigation involving 
noncompete agreements. The legislature may also be unwilling to amend 
Louisiana’s noncompete statute by prohibiting reformation of overly 
broad noncompete agreements. Thus, another avenue to remedy the 
problems of overuse and uncertainty of enforceability of noncompete 
agreements must be available.  
B. A Judicial Solution: Arming Employees and Employers with the 
Counterweight of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
Whether or not the Louisiana Legislature changes Louisiana’s 
noncompete law to control the overuse of noncompete agreements and the 
damage that overly broad noncompete agreements cause to employees, 
Louisiana should also adopt the tort of intentional interference with 
contractual relations in the employment context. Although Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
it incurred expenses in the training of the employee or expenses in the advertising 
of the business. Id. 
 178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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currently utilizes a unique application of this tort,180 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court could expand the tort to apply to overly broad noncompete 
agreements. Employees armed with a cause of action in tort will be better 
able to combat the threat of restricted employment even though the 
noncompete agreement is unenforceable. Additionally, employers will be 
able to use the tort to bring an action when a former employee or a 
competitor interferes with their legitimate business interests. 
1. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations in Other 
Jurisdictions 
Every state in the United States recognizes the common law tort of 
intentional interference with contractual relations, although the elements 
of the tort vary from state to state.181 Most states use the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts as the basis for their laws.182 The Restatement defines 
the tort as: 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person 
by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform 
the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary 
loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to 
perform the contract.183 
Most cases involving intentional interference with contractual 
relations in the realm of noncompete agreements arise when a new 
                                                                                                             
 180. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 181. Gary D. Wexler, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market 
Efficiency and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV. 279, 292 
(1994) (“Since the 1989 Louisiana decision of 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 
all fifty states now recognize some form of tortious interference with contract.”). 
 182. The Restatement also recognizes variations of intentional interference 
with contractual relations. The Restatement states that a tortfeasor may be liable 
for interference with a prospective contractual relation, which may be relevant in 
situations where a job applicant is turned down for a job because of the 
prospective employer’s belief that the applicant is bound by an enforceable 
noncompete agreement, like in Kimball. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
766B (1979) (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s 
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability 
to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the 
relation, whether the interference consists of: (a) inducing or otherwise causing a 
third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing 
the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.”). 
 183. Id. § 766. 
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employer attempts to hire an employee who is bound by a noncompete 
agreement.184 In these cases, most states require that the plaintiff have a 
valid noncompete agreement and that the competitor know of the 
agreement and hire the employee anyway.185 States define the intent 
element differently, but most states follow the Restatement’s rule that the 
actor does not necessarily have to “act for the purpose of interfering with 
the contract . . . but [the actor] knows that the interference is certain or 
substantially certain to occur as a result of his action.”186 An interfering 
party may be subject to pecuniary loss resulting from the interference in 
addition to any consequential harms that the interference caused.187 
A lesser-known application of intentional interference with contractual 
relations occurs when a former employer interferes with an employee’s new 
employment by trying to apply an overly broad noncompete agreement. For 
example, in SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc. v. Henry,188 the Florida 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal upheld an employee’s claim for intentional 
interference after the employee was terminated from his new job because 
his previous employer attempted to enforce an expired noncompete 
agreement.189 The court held that if a company attempts to enforce an 
invalid noncompete agreement that causes the employee to lose his job, a 
judicial remedy for damages is available for the employee.190 Although 
intentional interference with contractual relations has been used in the 
employment context in other jurisdictions, Louisiana has yet to expand the 
tort to this arena.  
2. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations in Louisiana 
Although Louisiana does not recognize the tort of intentional 
interference with contractual relations in the employment context, the 
courts have adopted the tort in a very narrow circumstance. Louisiana, 
however, was the last state in the nation to recognize any form of 
                                                                                                             
 184. Peter R. Ulanowicz, Taking the Fight to the Bullies: Tortious Interference 
Liability for Both Employer and Attorney on Baseless Restrictive Covenants, Part 
I, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2011, at 28. 
 185. Henry F. Luepke, Tortious Interference with Covenants Not to Compete, 
J. MO. B., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 88, 90. 
 186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, cmt. j. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 839 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 189. Id. at 706. 
 190. Id. 
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intentional interference with contractual relations.191 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court refused to recognize the action in Kline v. Eubanks.192 In 
Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,193 however, the Court provided a 
glimpse of its shifting away from its long-time resistance to the action.194 
In a footnote, the court suggested that even though the Sanborn case did 
not present the issue, the plaintiff would have a cause of action for 
intentional interference if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant 
“intentionally and willfully interfered with plaintiff’s contract” and that 
the interference was the “proximate cause of the failure of the contract.”195 
Although the Court’s statement was dicta, that footnote opened the door 
for the Court to adopt the tort of intentional interference with contractual 
relations.  
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney,196 
followed the suggestion in Sanborn when it removed the bar on the 
application of intentional interference with contractual relations and 
recognized a narrow and fact-specific application of the tort.197 Recognizing 
Louisiana’s longstanding refusal to utilize intentional interference with 
contractual relations, the Court stated that its intent was not to “adopt whole 
and undigested the fully expanded common law doctrine of interference 
with contract.”198 Instead, the Court limited Louisiana’s application of 
intentional interference with contractual relations to “only a corporate 
officer’s duty to refrain from intentional and unjustified interference with 
the contractual relation between his employer and a third person.”199  
                                                                                                             
 191. Bruce V. Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1983–1984: Obligations, 45 
LA. L. REV. 447, 465–66 (1984); Wex S. Malone, Torts, 25 LA. L. REV. 334, 341 
(1965) (“Unfortunately, Louisiana is the only remaining American jurisdiction 
where the malicious inducement of a breach of contract is not regarded as an 
actionable wrong.”). 
 192. 33 So. 211 (La. 1902). 
 193. 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984). 
 194. Id. at 95 n.5. In 1981, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal 
suggested that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s “unflinching adherence” to Kline 
needed to be reexamined in light of the changing social and economic conditions 
of the times. Moss v. Guarisco, 409 So. 2d 323, 330 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 195. Sanborn, 448 So. 2d at 95 n.5. 
 196. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 234. 
 199. Id. The elements of a claim of intentional interference with contractual 
relations against a corporate officer are as follows:  
(1) The existence of a contract or a legally protected interest between the 
plaintiff and the corporation;  
(2) The corporate officer’s knowledge of the contract;  
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The Spurney Court rationalized this holding in “light of modern 
empirical considerations and the objectives of delictual law.”200 The Court 
used common law authorities, finding that these authorities were 
consistent with civilian delictual principles reflected in Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2315 that “obliges a person to repair damage caused [to] 
another by his fault.”201 Spurney recognized the need to limit the tort’s 
application in Louisiana, however, and stated that open questions about 
the tort still persisted, such as what kind of contract is protected and what 
kind of interference is actionable.202  
Spurney’s fact-specific application of intentional interference with 
contractual relations leaves the state of the tort in flux.203 Because 
Louisiana’s version of the tort is different from that of any other state, 
employers and employees have little guidance as to the scope of the tort’s 
applicability. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court should expand the tort to 
be applicable in the employment context. This would allow the tort to serve 
as a remedy to employees harmed by overly broad noncompete agreements 
and employers harmed by breaches of valid noncompete agreements.  
3. Adopting Tortious Interference in the Employment Context in 
Louisiana 
As compared to damages under article 2033 or other contractual or 
quasi-contractual damages, a tort remedy might provide more recovery for 
the aggrieved party. An employee could seek a declaratory judgment to 
                                                                                                             
(3) The officer’s intentional inducement or causation of the corporation 
to breach the contract or his intentional rendition of its performance 
impossible or more burdensome;  
(4) Absence of justification on the part of the officer; and 
(5) Causation of damages to the plaintiff by the breach of contract or 
difficulty of its performance brought about by the officer.  
See id. 
 200. Id. at 231. The court applied the principles of Louisiana Civil Code article 
2315. 
 201. Id. at 233–34. 
 202. Id. at 234. 
 203. Less than a year after Spurney was decided, the Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal expressly stated that “Louisiana law does not recognize the tort 
of intentional interference with contracts.” Compadres, Inc. v. Johnson Oil & Gas 
Corp., 547 So. 2d 382, 390 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Justice Dennis later clarified that 
“[t]his court recently recognized for the first time in some 87 years the possibility 
of a narrowly drawn action for intentional interference with contractual rights and 
indicated that it would proceed with caution in expanding that cause of action.” 
Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 557 So. 2d 966, 969 (La. 1990). 
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have the noncompete agreement declared invalid, but expecting every 
employee to go to court every time they sign a noncompete agreement to 
determine its validity is unreasonable. Under that flawed expectation, 
every time an employee changed jobs and signed a noncompete 
agreement, that employee would have to sue the employer to have a court 
declare an overly broad noncompete agreement invalid. Instead, a tort 
remedy would deter employers from drafting overly broad noncompete 
agreements for fear of being held liable under a tort theory, thus decreasing 
the need for employees to have those agreements ruled invalid.  
If an employee does not leave his or her current employment because 
the employer threatens to enforce an overly broad noncompete agreement, 
the tort could provide in terrorem204 effects to the employer, equalizing 
the threat of the overly broad noncompete agreement.205 Further, an 
employer who threatens to enforce an overly broad noncompete agreement 
against an employee who has obtained other employment is interfering 
with the contractual relation between the employee and the new 
employer.206 In this situation, the employee can answer the previous 
employer’s threat with a reconventional demand for damages in tort.207 
Adopting intentional interference with contractual relations does not 
just benefit employees, however. Implementation of the tort would allow 
former employers to sue current employers for intentional interference 
when a valid noncompete agreement restricts the employee.208 Arguably, 
this action could threaten employees if prospective employers, fearful of 
incurring litigation costs, are hesitant to hire people bound by a 
noncompete agreement. In addition to litigation costs, prospective 
employers may be cautious about investing money to train an employee 
who is bound by a noncompete agreement because of the chance that the 
former employer will bring an action to enforce the noncompete 
agreement and enjoin the employee from working for the competitor.209 
Despite these potentially negative effects to employees by adopting the 
tort, the benefits outweigh the dangers to employees because a former 
                                                                                                             
 204. In terrorem effects are those that act “by way of threat” or “as a warning.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 88, at 896. 
 205. See generally Ulanowicz, supra note 184. 
 206. Id. at 28. 
 207. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1061 (2015) (“The defendant in the principal 
action may assert in a reconventional demand any causes of action which he may 
have against the plaintiff in the principal action . . . .”). A reconventional demand 
is the equivalent of a counter claim in common law jurisdictions. 
 208. See, e.g., DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Jones, No. 2:13-CV-392, 2013 WL 
8118533 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2013). 
 209. See Brandon S. Long, Protecting Employer Investment in Training: 
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1298–1302 (2005). 
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employer would only be able to use the tort if it first drafted a valid 
noncompete agreement.  
Variations of tortious interference with contractual relations claims 
exist that the Louisiana Supreme Court could adopt, namely the distinction 
between negligent and intentional interference. Louisiana could adopt one 
or both variations with different requirements of intent. The first option is 
to adopt both negligent and intentional interference and apply a narrow 
definition of intent to the intentional interference tort. The second option 
is to only adopt intentional interference but apply a more broad definition 
of intent. 
The tort of interference with contractual relations, whether negligent 
or intentional, first requires the interference to be the cause of the 
damage.210 Under a negligent interference with contractual relations cause 
of action, any employer who drafts an overly broad noncompete agreement 
that causes an employee damage will be liable.211 In cases where the 
prospective employer never learns of the overly broad noncompete 
agreement or where the prospective employer is made aware of the 
noncompete agreement but does not make hiring decisions based on the 
agreement, neither intentional nor negligent interference is applicable. The 
reason for the inapplicability of the tort is because the overly broad 
noncompete agreement is not the cause of damage.  
Next, some degree of intent must exist.212 The degree of intent varies 
with respect to the tort. For negligent interference, intent is irrelevant.213 
For intentional interference, the court may choose what degree of intent is 
sufficient—whether the employer must only intend to draft a noncompete 
agreement, intend to knowingly draft an overly broad noncompete 
agreement, or intend that the overly broad noncompete agreement cause 
                                                                                                             
 210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (intentional 
interference with contractual relation); id. § 766B (intentional interference with 
prospective contractual relation). 
 211. For an argument of why Louisiana should not reject the application of 
negligent interference with contractual relations, see Rebecca L. Lear, Comment, 
Negligent Interference with Contract—An Argument Against Categorical Rejection: 
Applying a Duty/Risk Analysis to Negligent Drug Testing, 60 LA. L. REV. 855 (2000). 
 212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (intentional interference 
with contractual relation); id. § 766B (1979) (intentional interference with 
prospective contractual relation). 
 213. See id. § 766C (“One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not 
deriving from physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor’s 
negligently (a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, or 
(b) interfering with the other’s performance of his contract or making the 
performance more expensive or burdensome, or (c) interfering with the other’s 
acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.”). 
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harm to the employee. Depending on how intent is defined, intentional 
interference with contractual relations may not give a remedy to an 
employee who suffers harm. Negligent interference with contractual 
relations, however, may provide a remedy.  
The first option is to adopt negligent interference and intentional 
interference with a narrow definition of intent. A narrow definition of 
intent could be that an employer intended not only to draft an overly broad 
noncompete agreement, but also intended that the invalid agreement cause 
harm to the employee. For instance, if an employer drafts a geographically 
overly broad noncompete agreement and the employee loses a prospective 
job as a result of the invalid agreement, the employee may have a cause of 
action against the former employer for negligent interference, but would 
not have a cause of action for intentional interference. Louisiana courts, 
however, are reluctant to adopt both intentional and negligent interference 
with contractual relations.214  
Given this reluctance, the second and preferable option is for 
Louisiana to adopt only intentional interference with contractual relations, 
and apply a broad definition to the requisite intent to provide some remedy 
to aggrieved employees. The definition of intent must be broad enough to 
impose liability on an employer who knowingly drafts an overly broad 
noncompete agreement or drafts an agreement with the substantial 
certainty that it is overly broad. Although an employer may not have 
malicious intent to harm an employee, the employer will likely know with 
substantial certainty that future employers will become aware of the 
noncompete agreement and may make adverse employment decisions 
based on the invalid agreement.215 This broad definition would also 
include an employer’s intent to interfere with the employee’s future job 
prospects if it knew that the noncompete agreement were invalid. The very 
purpose of a noncompete agreement is to prevent current employees from 
being employed elsewhere, so intentionally drafting an overly broad 
noncompete agreement that causes the employee to sustain damage would 
qualify as intent. Similarly, when the tort is used by a former employer 
against a current employer, sufficient intent would require that the current 
                                                                                                             
 214. See Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 557 So. 2d 966, 969 (La. 
1990); see generally Lear, supra note 211. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court 
has not officially adopted the tort of negligent interference with contractual 
relations, the Court has acknowledged the cause of action in cases involving 
negligent drug testing that prevents a person from obtaining employment. Id. 
 215. Blake, supra note 25, at 627 (stating that noncompete agreements 
“diminish competition by intimidating potential competitors and slowing down the 
dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods”). 
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employer intended to hire the employee when it knew that a valid 
noncompete agreement was in place.  
Recognizing claims of intentional interference with contractual 
relations would be a substantial move in Louisiana that would broaden the 
current doctrine despite past resistance. The tort would allow employees 
like Catherine Kimball to sue previous employers because of a lost job 
opportunity that the overly broad noncompete agreement caused. 
Additionally, the tort would equalize the threat of noncompete agreements 
for employees who stay in a job because of the threat of a noncompete 
agreement. Finally, the tort allows an employee who is sued by a previous 
employer to answer the suit with a reconventional demand.216 In addition 
to the benefits that employees enjoy from the tort, employers can also use 
intentional interference with contractual relations against a former 
employee or a competitor when the competitor hires a former employee 
when there is a valid noncompete agreement.217 The tort would provide 
the former employer with a remedy of tort damages for any business 
expenses lost or costs incurred due to the breach. 
C. The Not-So-Magic Formula 
The best option to solve the legal problems in Louisiana’s noncompete 
law that cause noncompete agreements to be overused and overly broad is 
for the legislature to amend Louisiana’s noncompete law. Amending 
section 23:921 to require employers to prove a protectable interest in 
restraining the employee would reduce the number of noncompete 
agreements issued.218 Louisiana should also amend section 23:921 to 
expressly prohibit reformation of overly broad noncompete agreements, 
which would force employers to be more diligent in drafting enforceable 
agreements.219 Eliminating reformation would reinstitute the certainty of 
Louisiana’s noncompete law that the legislature sought to achieve by 
requiring that noncompete agreements strictly comply with section 23:921 
to be enforceable. 
If the Louisiana Legislature is unwilling to make these changes to the 
noncompete law, the Louisiana Supreme Court should expand the tort of 
intentional interference with contractual relations to apply to overly broad 
noncompete agreements. This expansion would create a cause of action 
for employees harmed by overly broad noncompete agreements or 
employers harmed by breach of a valid agreement. Due to the overuse of 
                                                                                                             
 216. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1061 (2015). 
 217. See Luepke, supra note 185, at 89–90. 
 218. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 219. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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noncompete agreements and the incentive for employers to draft overly 
broad agreements, employees are either remaining in jobs they would 
otherwise leave or losing prospective jobs because of seemingly valid 
noncompete agreements. The tort would allow employees to stand on 
equal footing against an employer that is threatening to enforce an overly 
broad noncompete agreement. Using the tort will not benefit only 
aggrieved employees, but it will also provide employers with an additional 
tool for protecting their business interests by allowing them to sue a new 
employer that hires an employee who is bound by a valid noncompete 
agreement.  
No magic formula exists to solve the legal deficiencies that cause the 
problems of overly broad and overused noncompete agreements. If the 
legislature agrees to amend the statute, it is less necessary for the Louisiana 
Supreme Court to adopt the tort. The adoption of both the legislative 
reforms and intentional interference is ideal, however, as the tort provides 
additional protections for employers and employees even after the 
problems in the statute are solved. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of Louisiana’s noncompete law leads to overuse of 
noncompete agreements and uncertainty about when an agreement is 
enforceable. Employees like Catherine Kimball, who lost a job due to an 
overly broad noncompete agreement, do not currently have an adequate 
remedy for damages. Further, employees who stay in a job due to the threat 
of enforcement of a noncompete agreement need to be armed with 
something to balance the power vis-à-vis the employer. Finally, 
employees who are subject to suit by a former employer that is attempting 
to enforce an overly broad noncompete agreement need a mechanism to 
hold employers accountable and deter them from intentionally drafting 
and enforcing overly broad noncompete agreements. 
Although the Kimball court found remedies for breach of a 
noncompete agreement rooted in Louisiana’s nullity law, those remedies 
are insufficient.220 The Louisiana Legislature and judiciary must remove 
noncompete agreements from the tangled web of nullity. Instead, 
Louisiana noncompete law should require employers to demonstrate a 
protectable interest in restricting an employee and should foreclose on the 
ability to reform overly broad noncompete agreements. These two 
solutions will solve the problems of these agreements being overused and 
overly broad. With these solutions, adopting intentional interference with 
                                                                                                             
 220. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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contractual relations in the context of overly broad noncompete 
agreements will stifle the overuse and uncertainty of enforceability of 
noncompete agreements by arming employers and employees with a 
countervailing weight against the enforcement of the agreements. Either 
solution, or both solutions used together, will equalize the threat of 
noncompete agreements and bring equity to Louisiana’s noncompete law. 
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